The role of types in categorical models of meaning is investigated. A general scheme for how typed models of meaning may be used to compare sentences, regardless of their grammatical structure is described, and a toy example is used as an illustration. Taking as a starting point the question of whether the evaluation of such a type system 'loses information', we consider the parametrized typing associated with connectives from this viewpoint.
Introduction
A recent trend in linguistics [7] is to extend linguistic models of meaning from words to sentences. Either implicitly or explicitly, this is done via a type system -based on a categorical grammar -equipped with a notion of evaluation. This notion of evaluation is crucial, in that it is used to reduce all grammatically correct sentences to the same type, where they may be compared and their similarity evaluated. In this chapter, we describe this typing and evaluation process in an abstract categorical setting, based around a toy example.
We then consider the deceptively simple question of whether this evaluation process (mapping all grammatically correct sentences to entities of the same type) is reversible or not -i.e. does evaluation lose information? Our conclusion is that in general, forgetting information is an inevitable and crucial part of this process. However, we also demonstrate that connectives are a special case, having an entirely reversible interpretation. Following this observation to its inevitable mathematical conclusion, we discover a connection between reversibility and polymorphic typing, in both the linguistic and logical sense.
The relevant structures are familiar from a wide range of settings, ranging from models of lambda calculus and the Geometry of Interaction, to fractals, tilings, and the Thompson groups. This chapter demonstrates a further close connection with abstract categorical models of quantum mechanics. Precisely, we derive a (lax, infinitary) form of the special sort of Frobenius algebras known as classical structures, around which categorical approaches to quantum information and computation are based.
Introducing typing to models of meaning
The method of comparing meaning of words known as distributional semantics is well-knownand as such, we restrict our description to the features that will be particularly relevant to the typing process. We then give a simple example of how typing, along with an evaluation operation, is used to allow the comparison of quantities in physics. This is followed by a formal description of what we mean by a typed system, based around the theory of monoidal closed categories, and an indication of how we expect such a categorical typing in models of meaning to allow us to compare arbitrary sentences, regardless of their grammatical structure.
As described in Chapter 6, distributional semantics provides a method of associating a vector (the meaning vector) with each word in a dictionary, based on its usage in some corpus. Vectors may then be compared with each other, using any of the familiar tools from linear algebra (generally, the scalar product), giving a measure of the similarity, or overlap between words. The simple but ambitious aim is to extend this to extend this process to sentences, rather than single words, using the following scheme:
1. Single words are assigned types, based on their role; this typing is extended to sentences, which are typed by their grammatical structure.
2. Associated with the type system is an evaluation, or reduction, process that reduces all grammatically correct sentences to elements of the same type (this is, as described elsewhere, a common approach in categorical linguistics).
3. Crucially, elements of the same type can be compared, providing a method of comparing the meaning of grammatically distinct sentences, in a similar way to distributional semantics.
It hardly needs emphasising that this is a very ambitious program; instead of aiming to provide a complete or partial solution, this chapter describes features that such a model of meaning necessarily requires, at the level of the types.
What is a type?
To a categorical logician, the answer is straightforward: a type is an object in a (monoidal, closed) category. To explain this, we first give a simple example of typing in basic physics, followed by the formal definition, and an illustration of why such a type system would also be useful in linguistic models of meaning.
Types in elementary physics
A simple, but illustrative, example of a typed system comes from basic physics, where the units of measurement may be thought of as the types of quantities.
The familiar seven basic SI units (kilogram (kg), second (s), metre (m), lumen (lm), &c.) are the fundamental types, and further types may be built up recursively, using these base types and two operations known as pairing and abstraction 1 :
• (Pairing) Given two types S, T , the pair type ST may be formed. For example luminous energy is measured in lumen seconds, and hence has type lm s.
• (Abstraction) Given two types L, M , the abstraction type M L −1 may be formed. For example velocity is given in metres per second, and hence has type m s −1 .
Associated with such a type system is a notion of evaluation or reduction. A quantity of type Y X −1 may be combined with a quantity of type X to return a quantity of type Y . For example, let us calculate how far light, with a velocity of c = 2.997 × 10 8 ms −1 , travels in 1.3s. 
Considering the typing only, we see a reduction of the form
In this case, evaluation is simply the operation of multiplication 2 . Thus, we observe that the type system for SI units is in fact commutative (i.e. the type XY is identical to the type Y X). As a simple consequence of this, ordering is irrelevant, and (for example) ms −1 is equivalent to s −1 m. In general, and in categorical linguistics in particular, neither commutativity nor symmetry (i.e. commutativity up to isomorphism) may be assumed. To avoid ambiguity, we will therefore use type-theoretic notation, and write either [S → T ] or [T ← S] instead of T S −1 . Strictly, this means that we should consider two distinct evaluation operations; however, the required evaluation is often clear from the context, so for simplicity of notation we do not distinguish between the two, unless absolutely essential.
How we wish to use types in models of meaning
By analogy with how types are used in the above simple example, we wish to consider models of meaning where words and phrases are typed according to their grammatical structure, and the evaluation operation associated with the type system reduces all (grammatically correct) sentences to the same typethe sentence type S. Consider the simplest possible sentence structure:
If we assume that the noun phase is of some primitive type N P , an intransitive verb can only have type [N P → S], where S is the sentence type. The reduction of the sentence to the type S then proceeds by direct analogy with Equation 2:
Monoidal closed categories
The above notions may be formalised in the field of category theory. We refer to Chapter 1 for the basic notions of (monoidal) category theory; however, we will be forced to take a more formal approach, and explicitly consider the structural isomorphisms:
Definition 3.1. Symmetric monoidal categories A monoidal category is defined to be a category C, together with a functor ⊗ : C × C → C that satisfies, for all A, B, C ∈ Ob(C):
• Unit objects There exists I ∈ Ob(C) satisfying I ⊗ A ∼ = A ∼ = A ⊗ I.
•
If a monoidal category satisfies the additional condition
it is called a symmetric monoidal category. The above isomorphisms exhibiting associativity or symmetry are natural, and satisfy various coherence conditions laid out in [30] .
Due to MacLane's celebrated coherence theorem for associativity, we may treat the associativity isomorphisms as though they are strict identities -so we not distinguish between A ⊗ (B ⊗ C) and (A ⊗ B) ⊗ C. We follow this practice until Section 8, where the distinction between the two will become important.
Definition 3.2. Monoidal closed categories
Let (C, ⊗) be a monoidal category. We say that it is monoidal closed when there exists a functor
[ → ] : C op × C → C called the internal hom functor, such that for fixed B ∈ Ob(C), the functors given by [B → ] : C → C and ⊗ B : C → C form an adjoint pair. Equivalently, for all X, Y, Z ∈ Ob(C), there exists a natural isomorphism
The above definition is concise, albeit very abstract (for example, we refer to [30] for the definition of an adjoint pair of functors). Instead we use the following characterisation that makes the existence and role of an evaluation map central:
The above definition of a monoidal closed category is equivalent to the following:
For every pair of objects A, B ∈ Ob(C), there exists
where, for all f : A ⊗ X → B, there exists unique g ∈ C(X, [A → B]) such that the following diagram commutes:
Eval A,B y y Proof. Proofs may be found in any text on category theory or categorical logic (e.g. [30, 25] ). P
Monoidal closed categories as type systems
The connection between the theory of monoidal closed categories, and the (very elementary) type system presented in Section 3 should then be straightforward. More generally, we take a categorical perspective, and define a type as an object in a monoidal closed category. The operation of pairing from Section 3 is then simply the monoidal tensor ⊗ , and the operation of abstraction from the same section is the internal hom functor [ → ] . Finally, the reduction operation is simply the evaluation derived in Theorem 3.3.
The question then arises: in this setting, what is an quantity of a certain type, and how may such quantities be compared?
Elements, scalars, daggers and duals
The objects of a monoidal closed category do not come equipped with a notion of membership, so it it not accurate to talk about ' a member x of some object N '. Instead we have the notion of elements of an object. Definition 3.4. Given a monoidal category (C, ⊗, I), an element of some object N ∈ Ob(C) is a member of C(I, N ) i.e. an arrow from I to N . The category (C, ⊗, I) is called well-pointed when, for all f = g ∈ C(X, Y ), there exists some element a ∈ C(I, X) such that f a = ga ∈ C(I, Y ).
For well-pointed categories, it is easy to see how the notion of elements is a reasonable replacement for the notion of membership. Most of this chapter is based on elements of a category, and their interaction with the monoidal structure, and the categories with which we work are generally well-pointed. We will point out when results depend on this assumption, or when we are (unusually) referring to a non well-pointed category.
In order to compare elements of an object, we need a small amount of extra structure: Definition 3.5. A dagger operation on a category C is a (contravariant) involutive endofunctor, usually written ( ) † : C op → C that is the identity on objects, so A † = A for all A ∈ Ob(C). An arrow f ∈ C(A, B) satisfying f † f = 1 A is called an isometry, and when this is a two-sided inverse (so f † is also an isometry), then f is called unitary.
Let ⊗ be a monoidal tensor on C. When the monoidal structure has a well-behaved interaction with the dagger operation (that is, all canonical isomorphisms are unitary), then (C, ⊗, ( ) † ) is called a dagger monoidal category.
Dagger monoidal categories provide us with exactly the structure we need to compare elements: Definition 3.6. Following [1] , arrows from I to itself in a monoidal category with daggers are called abstract scalars. Given two elements of the same object x, y ∈ C(I, X), their generalised inner product is the endomorphism of the unit object given by
Thus generalised inner products act as comparisons, give a result that is an arrow from the unit object to itself. This fits in well with our usual intuition of what it means to compare the similarity of elements, in that in various settings C(I, I)| is (for example) the real line R, the complex plane C, the natural numbers N, the unit interval [0, 1], etc. We take care to avoid using categories where the endomorphism monoid of the unit object is trivial (e.g. globally defined functions, relations on sets, vector spaces with direct sum as monoidal tensor, etc.). Proposition 3.7. Let (C, ⊗, I) be a monoidal category.
1. C(I, I) is an abelian monoid.
2. Up to canonical isomorphism, α ⊗ β = αβ = βα.
3. When C is a dagger monoidal category, then for all X, Y ∈ Ob(C) and elements
Proof. We refer to [1] for proofs.
Much of the terminology and notation used in dagger monoidal categories comes from a canonical motivating example:
Example 3.8. This example is based on [2] . Complex finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces form a dagger monoidal category, where the monoidal tensor is the usual tensor product, and the dagger is the usual Hermitian adjoint ( ) H . The unit object is then the underlying scalar field, i.e. the complex plane C, and an endomorphism of the unit object is a linear map on a one-dimensional space -that is, multiplication by some complex scalar.
Elements of some finite-dimensional space H are then simply linear maps from C to H -which are, of course, in one-to-one correspondence with the points of H. Moving from points of a space to linear maps of a space is exactly the idea behind Dirac notation for states; instead of working with the point ψ ∈ H, we work with the linear map |ψ : C → H. The (categorical) generalised inner product is then exactly the composite |φ H |ψ , i.e. the usual inner product φ|ψ of vectors in a Hilbert space, expressed in Dirac notation.
We also refer to [2] for the monoidal closure of this category, and the quantummechanical interpretation of the categorical operations such as evaluation and the dagger.
In the above example, the generalised inner product is exactly the scalar product of vectors, and may be used to define a metric on elements of a (finitedimensional) Hilbert space. Thus, because of the first metric axiom, the generalised inner product may be used as a test of equality for elements. In other examples, (such as partial reversible functions on sets), the endomorphism monoid of the unit object is trivial, and the generalised inner product provides little or no information about elements. We axiomatise this distinction as follows: Definition 3.9. Let (C, ⊗, I( ) † ) be a dagger monoidal category. We say that ( ) : C op → C discriminates elements of A ∈ Ob(C) when, for all x, y ∈ C(I, A), x|y = 1 I ⇔ x = y ∈ C(I, A)
When ( ) † : C op → C discriminates elements of all objects of C, we simply say that it discriminates elements.
Elements, names, and evaluation
In a monoidal closed category, the elements of the object [X → Y ] ∈ Ob(C) have a natural interpretation as arrows from X to Y within C, as the following result makes clear: Proof. This is a standard result from the theory of closed categories and categorical logic [26, 25] . 
The intuitive meaning of evaluation is that it 'promotes' an element (i.e. the name of an arrow f ) to actual arrow within the category; more formally, the following diagram is a special case of the diagram of Theorem 3.3.
Eval A,B y y Thus, for example, we see that an element of the 'intransitive verb' object (as in Section 3.2) may also be considered as an arrow from the 'noun phrase' object to the 'sentence' object.
Given that elements of an object are themselves arrows in a category, it is natural to wonder what the name of an element is, or indeed the name of the name of an element, etc. Fortunately, such an eternal recurrence is avoided by the fact that, up to canonical isomorphism, elements 'name themselves'. Precisely, for any element x ∈ C(I, A) in a monoidal closed category, the following diagram commutes:
In the above diagram, lines denoting canonical coherence isomorphisms are simply labelled by " ∼ =". We follow this convention throughout, unless the precise coherence isomorphism is important.
Types for linguistics and models of meaning
In categorical linguistics, a common method of characterising grammatically correct sentences is to assign types (i.e. objects in a monoidal closed category) to words in such a way that the evaluation map takes all grammatically correct sentences to a single distinguished type S, called the sentence type. In particular as shown in [7] , this is the structure behind Lambek's pregroup semantics and other approaches to categorical linguistics. Thus, standard categorical models of linguistics provide a type system for models of meaning applicable to arbitrary sentences; however, we do not yet have actual elements, or any notion of how these interact with the evaluation process, the generalised inner product, or the monoidal tensor. An obvious analogy exists with the very powerful tool of dimensional analysis in basic physics [20] , which may be considered to be the underlying type system behind the SI units of Section 3, abstracted from consideration of actual quantities.
The remainder of this paper may be considered as an investigation of what it would mean to (re)introduce actual elements to the type system provided by categorical linguistics, and indeed what modifications must be made to the typing to account for the fact that we are interested in meaning as well as grammar.
Typed models of meaning -a toy example
In order to avoid becoming too abstract, we use a concrete example to illustrate how the program described above may be used to compare two sentences. We will use the following examples:
L1 Bobby loves Marilyn Monroe.
L2 I like Fidel Castro and his beard.
The classically educated reader will recognise these as lyrics from Bob Dylan songs. (Note that one of these lyrics is from an improvised live performance and is not part of the official Dylan canon [10] ); our interest is in how a typed model of meaning could be used to compare these distinct lyrics.
The first step we take is to instantiate the variable 3 in L2; as we are familiar with these sentences as Bob Dylan lyrics, it is reasonable to replace I by Bob Dylan, and adjust the verb from the first to the third person, giving L2 Bob Dylan likes Fidel Castro and his beard.
We draw these two sentences L1 and L2 in tree form as shown in Figure 3 .8, and consider how both the individual constituents and the sentences as a whole may be compared.
From these trees, we see that the basic grammatical components we require are: • Transitive Verbs (TV) likes, loves.
• Connectives (C) and.
• noun phrases (NP) Bob Dylan, Bobby, Marilyn Monroe, Fidel Castro, Fidel Castro's beard, Fidel Castro and his beard.
(We observe above that joining two noun phrases by a connective forms another noun phrase. This possibility must be reflected in the typing associated with connectives; this is explored further in Section 7 onwards).
Categorical features for a model of meaning
We now consider the requirements for some category Meaning in which the meanings of L1 and L2 may be evaluated and compared. We do not present a concrete example; rather we use machinery developed to lay down requirements that such a category must satisfy, and go on to consider the resulting categorical theory. For a type system that allows us to model grammatical structure and reduce grammatical sentences to elements of the same type, we require a monoidal closed structure, so Meaning is equipped with a monoidal tensor ( ⊗ ) : Meaning × Meaning → Meaning, a unit object I ∈ Ob(M ), and an internal hom, [ → ] : Meaning op × Meaning → Meaning. In order to compare elements, we will also require a dagger operation ( ) † : Meaning op → Meaning, compatible with the monoidal tensor, giving a generalised scalar product.
As our analysis will be based on elements of objects, it is reasonable to assume that (Meaning, ⊗, [ → ], I, ( ) † ) is well-pointed (Definition 3.4). We further assume that our model of meaning is complete, in the sense that distinct concepts are not unnecessarily identified by the generalised scalar product 4 ; categorically, this requires that the dagger operation discriminates elements, in the sense of Definition 3.9.
The category Meaning must also contain objects corresponding to the grammatical components given in Section 3.8 above. Thus N P, C, T V, S ∈ Ob(Meaning) are the objects corresponding to the noun phrase, connective, transitive verb, sentence types; we take the noun phrase and sentence types N P, S ∈ Ob(M ) as primitive and build up the others in terms of their desired behaviour under evaluation.
Finally, for illustrative purposes, we take Meaning(I, I) to be the unit interval [0, 1]. The putative interpretation is that x|y = 1 means complete equality of meaning between elements x and y, whereas x|y = 0 means that they have nothing in common. Composition of endomorphism arrows of the unit object is, as per the requirements of Proposition 3.7, simply multiplication.
Comparing simple nouns
Let us start with the respective subjects of L1 and L2 , the noun phrases Bobby and Bob Dylan. In a suitable typed system, these will be represented by two distinct elements of type N P
I
Bobby
These elements may be compared by computing their generalised inner product, giving
N P Bob Dylan † I Although this chapter does not present a concrete model of meaning, observe that the above comparison would be straightforward, using the distributional semantics approach described in Chapter 6. In the absence of any concrete data, we make a guess for illustrative purposes, and write Bobby|Bob Dylan = 0.98 ∈ Meaning(I, I)
Giving a high, if not perfect overlap
5 between Bobby and Bob Dylan.
Comparing transitive verbs
We now compare the central verbs of L1 and L2 , i.e. we wish to assign a value to the generalised inner product likes|loves . However, it is worth considering the typing that these elements must have. 
The comparison of likes and loves is the following generalised inner product
We again make an arbitrary guess 6 and write likes|loves = 0.75 ∈ Meaning(I, I)
Comparing noun phrases
In terms of comparing the primitive elements of L1 and L2, it now remains to compare the two objects of the transitive verbs: Marilyn Monroe, and Fidel Castro and his beard. Leaving aside for the moment the details of how two noun phrases may be combined with a connective to produce a further noun phrase, we are happy to declare that there never has been any significant overlap between Marilyn Monroe and Fidel Castro and his beard. Thus, our educated guess at this point is simply that M arilyn M onroe|F idel Castro and his beard = 0 ∈ Meaning(I, I)
Comparing words vs. comparing sentences
Bringing together the (entirely fictitious) values for the overlap between the meanings of words introduced above, we have the table shown in Figure 4 . The crucial question is whether these three values are enough to compare the meaning of L1 and L2 ? We first appeal to part 3 of Proposition 3.7, we may compute the generalised inner product of L1 and L2 , considered as elements of
Proposition 4.1. Using the values for the generalised scalar products of individual word proposed in Sections 3.10 -3.12, the inner product of the elements
Proof. This follows from the values given in Figure 4 , and part 3 of Proposition 3.7, where the interaction of generalised inner products and monoidal tensors is given.
However, we have compared these sentences before any evaluation has taken place -and the whole point of the typing system was that all well-formed sentences evaluate to the same sentence type S. The key question is then whether this matters, i.e.
Is comparison of sentences invariant under evaluation?

Inner products, evaluation, and inverses
The question at the end of Section 4 above should properly be considered as two distinct questions:
Does the evaluation arrow Eval
2. When the meaning of a word is some name f ∈ C(I, [X → Y ]), does the arrow f ∈ C(X, Y ) preserve inner products?
Question 1 is a fundamentally category-theoretic question, whereas question 2 is about how we expect categorical models of meaning to behave. In a dagger monoidal closed category (C, ⊗, [ → ], ( ) † ), both isometries and unitaries preserve generalised inner products, and the canonical isomorphisms for the monoidal structure are unitary. Therefore, any dagger monoidal category contains inner product preserving arrows -question 2 is simply asking whether any of these have a role to play in models of meaning.
As we are working within a well-pointed monoidal category with a dagger that discriminates elements, both these questions are about whether various categorical operations 'lose information', as the following result demonstrates:
be a well-pointed dagger monoidal category where the dagger discriminates elements, and let F ∈ C(A, B) preserve generalised Proof. Consider arbitrary elements of x, y ∈ C(I, A). As F preserves inner products, the following diagram commutes:
Simplifying this commuting diagram, we have
Thus, as C is well-pointed with a dagger that discriminates elements, we deduce that F † is a left inverse of F .
Note that the above result does not prove that F † is a two-sided inverse; indeed, in arbitrary Hilbert spaces, the inner-product preserving isomorphisms are exactly the unitary maps, whereas inner product preserving linear maps are simply isometries (which do indeed have a left inverse, but not necessarily a two-sided inverse).
Does evaluation preserve inner products?
We first address Question 1 of Section 5 above: is the evaluation map an isometry -i.e. is its dagger also a left inverse?
Given elements x, y of an object A ⊗ [A → B] in some monoidal closed category with a discriminating dagger, we may form elements of B by composing both x and y with the canonical evaluation map Eval A,B : A ⊗ [A → B] → B as shown below: is that Eval AB has a left inverse. Leaving aside the irrelevant (for our purposes) case where C does not have a discriminating dagger, in general the above diagram does not commute. One of the simplest counterexamples is the motivating example of Example 3.8, and quantum-mechanical interpretations of its categorical properties, where Evaluation interprets as (post-selected partial) measurement against a maximally entangled basis [2] . Of course, one of the most fundamental features of the Hilbert space model of quantum mechanics is that measurement (partial or total) is certainly not a reversible operation. Other examples include models of logic or lambda calculus, where evaluation is either β-reduction, or cut-elimination -neither of which are reversible operations 7 . The question is whether this is desirable or undesirable for a model of meaning? The linguistic justification for the answer to the second question of Section 5 helps demonstrate that it is in fact desirable.
Forgetfulness -a linguistic justification
We now address Question 2 from Section 5. The claim that we make is that it is vital for the evaluation process to be irreversible, since we need it to forget information -it is highly desirable that the arrows named by elements in our models of meaning do not have inverses.
As a motivating example, consider the simple noun phrase scruffy cats, built up from an adjective and another noun phrase:
The noun phrase cats is a simple element of the object N P , and from its behaviour we deduce that an adjective has typing AD = [N P ← N P ]. The term scruffy cats, before any reduction, is therefore is the following element:
Momentarily forgetting about typing questions, let us assume that the 'meaning' of both scruffy and cats has been derived using some variant of the distributional semantics described in Chapter 6. The 'meaning' of cats will then provide information about cats generally, whether scruffy, tidy, or invisible. Similarly, the adjective scruffy provides information about the general concept of scruffiness, whether applied to cats, dogs, or academics. From Proposition 3.10, an element scruf f y ∈ Meaning(I, [N P ← N P ]) is the name of some arrow scruf f y ∈ Meaning(N P, N P ). We then see that, at least in this setting, the arrow named by scruf f y ∈ Meaning(I, [N P ← N P ]) has something of the nature of a projector, or a partial identity, in that it acts to restrict a concept to a special case.
The above is not, of course, a formal justification. However, we also observe that reduction is often a multi-stage process, and the ability to compare sentences or sentence fragments at different levels may be a highly useful feature of a typed model of meaning. Consider sentences s 0 , t 0 of some com-
. This compound type may be reduced to S ∈ Ob(Meaning) in two stages.
given that s 0 |t 0 = s 1 |t 1 = s 2 |t 2 , we observe that it is possible to compare sentences at many different levels, depending on how much reduction has been carried out. This unusual feature may prove useful in dealing with ambiguity, or indeed in assigning meaning to non-compositional phrases such as Iron Curtain, where the meaning of this phrase is not derived by restricting the information about all possible curtains to those made of iron.
How to type connectives?
We have taken a digression in our aim of comparing the meaning of two distinct Bob Dylan lyrics; in particular, we left the question of how to deal with connectives unanswered. This was intentional, in that -as we demonstrate belowthe behaviour of connectives is closely connected with questions of reversibility and evaluation.
Recall that we treated the noun phrases
Marilyn Monroe
Fidel Castro and his beard
simply as two distinct noun phrases. However, 2 above is clearly the conjunction of two distinct noun phrases; rather than being a noun phrase itself, it is a compound that should evaluate to a noun phrase. The question then, is simply, how should we type and ? As the typing will prove rather intricate, we first consider an alternative method of dealing with connectives:
Distributivity and conjunction
A common point of view is that, given a sentence containing the conjunction of two noun phrases, it should simply be split in two using distributivity, and the two sentences treated separately. For example, using distributivity, L2 This seems to be valid from a grammatical point of view, and (assuming we resolve the anaphor his before applying distributivity) the meaning of L1 is indeed the conjunction of L1 a and L1 b . However, this is not always the case. Consider the following sentence:
T Fidel Castro and Marilyn Monroe played tennis
Applying distributivity, we get the (grammatically correct)
T a Fidel Castro played tennis.
T b Marilyn Monroe played tennis.
Intuitively, we are happy to believe the conjunction of T a and T b , but find T rather implausible -since tennis is generally an activity indulged in by two people, we deduce that it was a joint, shared game of tennis. Although the above example is somewhat facetious, the question of when and whether applying distributivity changes meaning has been heavily studied [35] , including in a legal context [34] . See [14] for a particular case involving arguments on whether distributivity is applicable to conjunction in the phrase "to keep and bear arms", and whether doing so changes the meaning of this phrase. It appears that, when we consider meaning as well as grammatical correctness, we are forced to consider how the connectives ( and, or, etc.) are typed, and behave under evaluation.
Typing connectives and polymorphism
The first problem is that although (based on its usage in L1) we might simply wish to type and as an element of [[N P → N P ] ← N P ] (or equivalently, [N P → [N P ← N P ]]), the word 'and' is used in other settings, as Figure 7 .2 demonstrates.
However, in every case, the appropriate typing appears to be where X ranges over types, according to context. The same phenomenon appears to apply to other binary connectives 8 Thus, it appears that the typing of binary connectives is polymorphic. We refer to [33] for the notion of parametrised types in computer science, and [11] for System F, the polymorphic lambda calculus. Borrowing notation from this polymorphic lambda calculus, we write the type of and as
We do not give a full treatment in terms of the polymorphic lambda calculus; rather we simply treat this as shorthand for the following: Given some binary connective B, then the type of B is dependent on the context; given some element of type U ⊗ B ⊗ V together with evaluation arrows Eval U,X and Eval V,X , then the 'polymorphically typed' connective B provides us with some element B X of type
Forgetfulness and binary connectives
In Section 6.1, we make an argument, based on linguistic interpretation, that the arrows of a category named by word of various types are forgetful -they lose 8 e.g. or may be substituted for and in any of the above. Also, although English does not have a single connective corresponding to 'exclusive or', one could easily conceive of sentences such as I like exactly one of Fidel Castro and his beard, which would behave in a similar way. However, the same does not hold for implies, which is generally applied to entire sentences only.
information, the example given being how adjectives should, in certain cases, act as projectors or partial identities, on noun phrases. However, it is clear that the connectives do not follow this general principle: when we use and to concatenate two sentences (or noun phrases, adverbs, &c.), we do not expect to lose any information about the constituents in this conjunction.
As a trivial example, consider taking some body of text, and replacing each full stop (period) by "and". Although legibility will rapidly be lost, it would be difficult to claim that any meaning or content has been erased. Thus, the element
is the name of an arrow in Meaning(X, [X ← X]) that is information-preserving in the sense laid out in Section 5 and Section 6.1. We consider the implications of this shortly, but first use some abstract category theory to simplify the types of arrows being named.
Revisiting types of connectives
In order to make a considerable simplification of the resulting theory, we now make the assumption that the left evaluation arrow and the right evaluation arrow are identical (at least, up to some canonical symmetry isomorphism). Although there is no decisive linguistic justification for this in general 9 , it is certainly satisfied by compact closed categories [22] , which feature heavily in models of linguistics and meaning such as the vector spaces as used in distributional semantics, the more general models of meaning of [7] , and purely grammatical models such as Lambek pregroups [24] .
Given this assumption, we may appeal to the defining equations of monoidal closure, from Definition 3.2, and -up to isomorphism -replace elements of type
Meaning((I, [X → [X ← X]]) by elements of type Meaning(I, [X ⊗ X → X]).
Thus (up to some canonical isomorphism that we elide in the following sections), a polymorphic connective such as and determines a family of elements
where X ranges over various objects, including {S, N P, AD, T V, . . .}. Further, as demonstrated in Section 7.3 above, in each case and X is the name of some arrow and X ∈ Meaning(X ⊗ X, X) that preserves generalised inner products, and thus (from Lemma 5.1) has a left inverse given by its dagger.
Do arrows named by connectives have a right inverse?
In Section 7.3 above, we made the case that the object-indexed family of arrows named by the connective and (and, quite possibly, other binary connectives) are information-preserving, in the sense that they are isometries -i.e their adjoint is a left inverse, and thus they preserve the generalised inner product. In fact, it is easy to make a case that their adjoint should be a two-sided inverse, and they are thus unitary 10 . The justification for this is (for the connective and, in the case of the sentence object S) is that, given some sentence W ∈ C(I, S), we can always find some pair of sentences U, V ∈ C(I, S) such that the (evaluation of the) sentence U ⊗ and ⊗ V has exactly the same intended meaning as W . A similar argument can be made for other objects in Meaning, and for other binary connectives.
Frobenius algebras and self-similarity
We have seen that, for every polymorphic connective c and appropriate object X ∈ Ob(Meaning), there exists some isomorphism c X ∈ Meaning(X ⊗ X, X) whose inverse is its dual c X −1 = c X † ∈ Meaning(X → X ⊗ X), and thus X ∼ = X ⊗ X i.e. the object X is self-similar in the sense of [15, 16] . The question we now address is whether, at least up to canonical isomorphism, this self-similarity gives rise to a Frobenius algebra structure at each of these objects in the category Meaning.
Frobenius algebras in categories, definitions, diagrammatics, various special cases and applications and well covered in other chapters, so the following exposition is brief. In particular, we refer to Chapter 7 for more detailed theory, and refer to Chapter 1 for a suitable string-diagram formalism. Definition 7.1. A Frobenius algebra in a monoidal category (C, ⊗, I) consists of a monoid structure (∇ : S ⊗ S → S, ⊥ : I → S) and a comonoid structure (∆ : S → S ⊗ S, : S → I) at the same object, where the monoid / comonoid pair satisfy the Frobenius condition
Expanding out the definitions of a monoid and a comonoid structure, we have:
An immediate observation is that the above axioms for the monoid / comonoid structure ignore coherence isomorphisms. In particular, they assume strict associativity -or at least, ignore the role of associativity isomorphisms. The same also holds for the Frobenius condition, since 1 S ⊗ ∆ ∈ C(S ⊗ S, S ⊗ (S ⊗ S)) whereas ∇ ⊗ 1 S ∈ C((S ⊗ S) ⊗ S, S ⊗ S). With this in mind, we make the following definition: Definition 7.2. A lax Frobenius algebra in a monoidal category (C, ⊗, I) is defined to be an object S ∈ Ob(C) along with arrows ∆ ∈ C(S, S ⊗ S) , ∇ ∈ C(S ⊗ S, S) , ∈ C(S, I) , ⊥ ∈ C(I, S)
that satisfies the axioms of Definition 7.1 above, up to canonical coherence isomorphisms.
It is also sometimes useful to consider structures that satisfy all the axioms for a Frobenius algebra -whether lax or strict -except those relating to the unit object (i.e. the existence of the arrows , ⊥, and axioms 3.-4. above). Such structures (S, ∆, ∇) are called unitless Frobenius algebras. These are particularly relevant when working with the unitless monoidal categories of definition 8.4 onwards.
Our claim, to be justified over the following sections, is that the arrows named by connectives do indeed provide (lax, unitless) Frobenius algebras in the category Meaning. However, the details of the exact canonical coherence isomorphisms required are subtle -and quite possibly controversial; we first need an in-depth investigation of the categorical structure of self-similarity.
Self-similarity, categorically
In this section, and the following sections, we do not appeal to MacLane's coherence theorem for associativity, and treat all associativity isomorphisms as though they were strict identities. For justification, we refer to Isbell's argument (quoted by MacLane in [30] as justification for introducing associativity up to isomorphism) and give an updating of Isbell's argument to a more general setting in Appendix B.
Definition 8.1. Let (C, ⊗, I) be a monoidal category. A self-similar structure (S, ¡, £) is defined to be an object S ∈ Ob(C), together with two mutually inverse arrows
• (code) ¡ ∈ C(S ⊗ S, S).
• (decode) £ ∈ C(S, S ⊗ S).
satisfying £¡ = 1 S⊗S and ¡£ = 1 S , so the following diagram commutes.
When there is a self-similar structure at some object S ∈ Ob(C), we say (using the terminology of [15, 16] ) that S is a self-similar object. Note that there may be many distinct self-similar structures at the same object.
When (C, ⊗, ( ) † ) is a dagger monoidal category, and ¡ = £ −1 = £ † , we say that (S, ¡, £) is a dagger-self-similar structure.
Motivating examples include the natural numbers N in various categories (relations, partial functions, partial reversible functions, &c.) with respect to various monoidal tensors (Cartesian product, disjoint union). Other examples arise in the study of fractals (the Cantor set [15] , and fractals in general [29] ), logical models such as Scott's celebrated domain-theoretic models of the untyped lambda calculus (see [25] for a categorical exposition), inverse semigroups and tilings [27, 21] , The Thompson groups [28] , and the Cuntz C * algebras [8] . Although there is a close connection between such self-similar structures and the canonical coherence isomorphisms of a monoidal category [17] , we emphasise that for any given object S, there are generally many self-similar structures. Simple cardinality arguments demonstrate that the set of bijections {f : N → N N} is uncountable; this is expanded on in Appendix A, where an explicit correspondence between interior points of the Cantor set and order-preserving bijections from N to N N is given.
Despite this, the maps between self-similar structures are particularly simple:
Definition 8.2. Given two self-similar structures (S, ¡ 1 , £ 1 ) and (S, ¡ 2 , £ 2 ) at some object S of a symmetric monoidal category (C, ⊗), a morphism between them is an arrow u ∈ C(S, S) such that the following diagram commutes:
be a morphism of selfsimilar structures. Then u : S → S is the isomorphism given by u = ¡ 2 £ 1 .
Proof. By definition of a self-similar structure, the following diagram commutes:
and hence u = ¡ 2 £ 1 . When these are dagger self-similar structures, it is also trivially unitary.
Thus, with this definition of morphism, self-similar structures at some object S ∈ Ob(C) form a skeletal category, where there is exactly one arrow between any two objects.
The generalised convolution functor
Given an arbitrary object of a monoidal category (C, ⊗), it generates a subcategory of C in the obvious way: Definition 8.4. Let T be an arbitrary object of a monoidal category (C, ⊗, I) . We define the category T ⊗ generated by T and ⊗ to be the wide subcategory of C with the following inductively defined objects:
• T ∈ Ob(T ⊗ ).
It is immediate that T ⊗ is closed under the monoidal tensor on both arrows and objects, and hence has all the structure of a monoidal category apart from the unit object I. Such categories are called unitless monoidal categories.
Unitless monoidal categories are (trivially) not well-pointed. However -as in the above example -they may arise as subcategories of well-pointed categories.
Proposition 8.5. Given a self-similar structure (S, ¡, £) in a monoidal category (C, ⊗), then for every X ∈ Ob(S ⊗ ), there exists isomorphisms
Proof. We give these isomorphisms inductively:
It is straightforward to verify that £ A ∈ C(S, A) and ¡ A ∈ C(A, S) are isomorphisms, and each others inverse. Similarly, when (S, ¡, £) is a dagger self-similar structure then ¡ A = £ † A ∈ C(A, S), for all A ∈ Ob(C).
For every self-similar structure (S, ¡, £) in some monoidal category (C, ⊗) there is an obvious functor from S ⊗ to C(S, S), considered as a one-object category: Definition 8.6. Given a self-similar structure (S, ¡, £) in a monoidal category (C, ⊗), we define the generalised convolution functor
as follows:
where ¡ Y : Y → S and £ X : S → X are as in Proposition 8.5.
Proposition 8.7. Given a self-similar structure (S, ¡, £) in a monoidal category (C, ⊗), the generalised convolution Φ ¡£ : S ⊗ → C(S, S) defined above is indeed a functor. Further, when (C, ⊗) is a dagger monoidal category, and (S, ¡, £) is a dagger self similar object, then the functor Φ ¡£ preserves the dagger, so
Untyped monoidal categories
As well as being functorial Φ ¡£ : S ⊗ → C(S, S) preserves many categorical properties, such as monoidal structures, categorical closure, categorical traces, etc. ( [16] ). We briefly outline how this gives C(S, S) the structure of a (oneobject) monoidal category: Definition 8.8. Given a self-similar structure (S, ¡, £) in a monoidal category (C, ⊗), we define the internal tensor of S determined by this self-similar structure to be the monoid homomorphism
given by the following generalised convolution:
We refer to [15, 16] for proof that this is a monoid homomorphism; this also follows from the fact that f ⊗ ¡£ g : S → S is, by definition, the image of f ⊗ g : S ⊗ S → S ⊗ S under the generalised convolution functor Φ ¡£ : S ⊗ → C(S, S). We now demonstrate that (C(S, S), ⊗ ¡£ ) is a one-object unitless monoidal category.
Theorem 8.9. Given S ∈ Ob(C) as above, then there exists some τ ¡£ ∈ C(S, S) satisfying, for all f, g, h ∈ C(S, S),
Proof. Let τ ¡£ ∈ C(S, S) be defined as follows:
Either direct calculation, or referring to [15, 16] will demonstrate that conditions 1. and 2. above are satisfied. Thus (C(S, S), ⊗ ¡£ ) satisfies all the axioms for a monoidal category, apart from the unit object. Note that in this category, associativity can only be up to isomorphism, and is never strict; forcing the identity τ ¡£ = 1 S will make C(S, S) collapse to an abelian monoid (See Appendix B).
A simple corollary of this is the following:
Corollary 8.10. Given a self-similar structure (S, ¡, £) in a monoidal category (C, ⊗, τ ), let Φ ¡£ : S ⊗ → C(S, S) be the functor of Definition 8.6. Then for all objects X, Y, Z, A, B, C ∈ Ob(S ⊗ ),
As well as preserving the monoidal structure, the functor Φ ¡£ preserves any symmetric monoidal structure. We outline the proof, and refer to [15, 16] for details.
Theorem 8.12. Let (S, ¡, £) be a self-similar structure of some symmetric monoidal category (C, ⊗, t, s) . Then the functor ⊗ ¡£ of Definition 8.8 above is symmetric, up to a natural isomorphism satisfying MacLane's hexagon condition. Further, when (S, ¡, £) is a dagger self-similar structure, then this canonical isomorphism is also unitary.
Proof. We define the arrow σ ¡£ ∈ C(S, S) by the following convolution:
Either direct calculation or reference to [15, 16] will also demonstrate the following:
Uniqueness of canonical isomorphisms will (in the same manner as Corollary 8.10) demonstrate that Φ ¡£ (σ A,B ) = σ ¡£ for arbitrary A, B ∈ Ob(S ⊗ ), and therefore, using almost identical reasoning to Corollary 8.11, when (S, ¡, £) is a dagger self-similar structure the arrow σ ¡£ ∈ C(S, S) is also unitary.
Untyped and polymorphically typed systems: a discussion
The functor Φ ¡£ of Definition 8.6 may be seen to be a general type-erasing construction; it maps various categorical structures to one-object (i.e. untyped) analogues of the same structures. Examples include, but are certainly not limited to, symmetric monoidal structures, categorical closure (including compact closure and Cartesian closure), categorical traces, projections and injections, &c. [15, 16] . The immediate question must then be:
Why are we spending so much time developing a type-erasing procedure, when the whole point of the linguistics project is to -introducetypes into models of meaning?
Recall that the starting point for our investigation of self-similarity was the (polymorphically typed) connectives; linguistic arguments were used to demonstrate that many of the objects corresponding to types in our models of meaning must be self-similar, with the self-similarity exhibited by the arrows named by connectives. Partly, therefore, the existence of such structures is forced upon us by the typing of connectives and their intended interpretation in some categorical model of meaning. However, there is a more fundamental justification; so far we have simply treated the polymorphically typed connectives as arrows parametrized by some class of objects. If we were to take a more foundational approach and look for models based on models of (for example) System F, we would discover a close connection between polymorphic typing and such a typeerasing procedure.
In models of polymorphic lambda calculus and related systems, the underlying categories commonly have a single object; the types of the logical system are built up from certain families of arrows, satisfying a 'biorthogonality' relation. Although this is far beyond the scope of this paper, we refer to [19] for an interesting point of view, and details and references for this kind of approach. From a linguistic point of view, we simply remark that it is perhaps not so surprising that the polymorphically typed terms are exactly those that do not lose information -inevitably and counterintuitively leading to such a type-erasing procedure.
Self-similarity and lax Frobenius algebras
We have now developed the categorical machinery that enables us to justify the claim made at the end of Section 7.6 that self-similar structures form (lax unitless) Frobenius algebras (Definition 7.2) i.e. they satisfy the axioms of Definition 7.1 (excluding those based on the unit object) up to canonical coherence isomorphisms.
Theorem 9.1. Let (S, ¡, £) be a self-similar structure in some monoidal category (C, ⊗, τ ), and let (C(S, S), ⊗ ¡£ , τ ¡£ ) be the corresponding one-object unitless monoidal category described in Theorem 8.9. Then the following conditions are satisfied 1. (unitless monoid) The arrow ¡ ∈ C(S ⊗ S, S) is associative, up to the canonical associativity isomorphisms τ S,S,S , τ ¡£ ,
(unitless comonoid)
The arrow £ ∈ C(S, S ⊗ S) is co-associative, up to the canonical associativity isomorphisms τ Proof. Almost by definition, the following diagrams may be seen to commute:
Corollary 9.2. Let (S, ¡, £) be a dagger self-similar structure in some dagger monoidal category (C, ⊗, τ ( ) † ). Then the dagger self-similar structure (S, ¡, £) is -up to the same canonical coherence isomorphisms listed above -a (unitless, lax) dagger Frobenius algebra.
Proof. This is a simple corollary of Theorem 9.1 above, Proposition 8.7, and Corollary 8.11.
Remark 9.3. The rôle of coherence isomorphisms in Theorem 9.1 From a certain point of view, the proof of Theorem 9.1 seems to be cheating, in that the diagrams used to prove associativity &c. up to isomorphism are minor variants of those used to define the associativity isomorphism τ ¡£ . In particular, it seems highly unsurprising that associativity and co-associativity hold up to isomorphism, since after all, the code and decode arrows are both themselves isomorphisms. What rescues this from being a triviality is that τ ¡£ is natural and satisfies MacLane's pentagon condition (Theorem 8.9). Therefore, in a very strong sense, it is exactly a canonical coherence isomorphism.
Even so, the fact that two, rather than one, canonical isomorphisms are required may be considered to be pushing the definition of 'lax' too far -especially since they are, technically, coherence isomorphisms for two distinct monoidal categories. However, these categories and monoidal tensors are not arbitrary; instead, one is a wide subcategory of the other, and the distinct monoidal tensors and coherence arrows are mutually definable by a generalised form of convolution. What is really required is a coherence theorem for this very special situation!
In the absence of a full coherence theorem covering such a situation, we are forced to rely on the familiar coherence theorems of MacLane for monoidal categories. Ultimately, however, the acid test must be whether such structures behave in a similar manner to more familiar Frobenius algebras. We are thus lead into particular examples of Frobenius algebras and their applications, to demonstrate that this is indeed the case.
Classical structures
A particular form of Frobenius algebra, used heavily in categorical quantum mechanics, is the classical structure [6] . When modelling quantum phenomena in abstract categories (e.g. as in [6, 32] ) the notion of a classical structure is fundamental in ways beyond the scope of this chapter -although fundamental to other chapters in this volume. Instead, we consider their behaviour in a particular concrete category.
In the symmetric dagger monoidal category (Hilb FD , ⊗( ) † ) of finite dimensional Hilbert spaces with tensor product and Hermitian adjoint, a classical structure at an object H ∈ Ob(Hilb FD ) is exactly an orthonormal basis for the Hilbert space H. Thus, each classical structure at on object determines matrix representations for linear maps on this object. The connection between orthonormal bases and measurements is clear, and the (physically reasonable) unitary maps arise as isomorphisms of classical structures, or equivalently as changes of basis. Definition 10.1. A classical structure (S, ∆, ∇, , ⊥) in a dagger monoidal category (C, ⊗, I, ( ) † ) is defined to be a dagger Frobenius algebra satisfying, for all f, g ∈ C(S, S),
3. (The Classical structure condition) ∇∆ = 1 S Note that Definition 10.1 above is somewhat over-axiomatised. In particular, as shown in [32] , the classical structure condition on any Frobenius algebra (S, ∆, ∇, , ⊥) in a dagger monoidal category will imply that (S, ∆, ∇, , ⊥) is a dagger Frobenius algebra. Further, once the identity ∆ = ∇ † is satisfied, then commutativity and co-commutativity are equivalent. We have deliberately taken this over-axiomatised route, since it is not clear how many of these implications will survive the passage to the lax unitless version of the above structures.
Definition 10.2. We define a lax classical structure in a dagger monoidal category (C, ⊗, I, ( ) † ) to be a lax unitless dagger Frobenius algebra satisfying conditions 1.-3. of Definition 10.1 above, up to canonical coherence isomorphisms.
Theorem 10.3. Let (S, ¡, £) be a dagger self-similar structure in a symmetric dagger monoidal category (C, ⊗, τ, σ), and let (C(S, S), ⊗ ¡£ , τ ¡£ , σ ¡£ ) be the corresponding one-object unitless dagger symmetric monoidal category Then:
1. (S, ¡, £) is a lax unitless dagger Frobenius algebra, 2. The arrow £ ∈ C(S, S ⊗ S) is co-commutative, up to the canonical coherence isomorphisms σ S,S , σ ¡£ , 3. The arrow ¡ ∈ C(S ⊗ S, S) is commutative, up to the canonical coherence isomorphisms σ S,S , σ ¡£ , 4. The classical structure condition ¡£ = 1 S holds, strictly.
and hence (S, ¡, £) is a lax classical structure.
Proof. As in Theorem 9.1, the following proof is almost by definition. We refer to Remark 9.3 for a discussion of the issues around this, and Section 11 below for justification by example of why this is reasonable.
1. We refer to Theorem 9.1 and Corollary 9.2 for a proof that (S, ¡, £) is a lax unitless Frobenius algebra.
2. By definition of σ ¡£ and naturality of canonical coherence isomorphisms, the following diagram commutes, for all f, g ∈ C(S, S):
and hence by naturality of both σ S,S and σ ¡£ ,
up to canonical coherence isomorphisms.
3. Similarly to 2., since σ S,S = σ
, and ¡ † = £, the commutativity of the above diagram for all f, g ∈ C(S, S) implies the commutativity of the following diagram:
and thus ¡ ∈ C(S ⊗ S, S) is commutative up to canonical coherence isomorphisms.
4. The defining equation of a self-similar structure is:
-a stronger (i.e. two-sided) version of the classical structure condition.
It may be objected again (as in Remark 9.3) that using canonical isomorphisms from two distinct settings is pushing the definition of a lax structure too far. In the absence of a full coherence theorem relating the monoidal tensor of a category (& its canonical isomorphisms) with the internal tensor at an object (& its canonical isomorphisms), this is worth considering.
However, we now present an intriguing example where distinct self-similar structures at some object S within a symmetric monoidal category determine distinct matrix representations for arrows on this object.
11 A self-similar structure familiar in logic (and linguistics)
One of the best-studied self-similar structures, at least in certain logical communities, is the dynamical algebra. There are many wide-ranging applications, including the pure untyped lambda calculus [9] , linear logic and the Geometry of interaction [12] , combinatory logic [3] . In [9] , the dynamical algebra is introduced as the monoid semiring P [N], where the monoid P may be defined in terms of generators and relations, as follows: P = p, q, p , q : pp = 1 =, pq = 0 = qp (This is of course, the inverse polycyclic monoid of [31] ). Other definitions vary in the precise notion of summation used, often restricting or generalising the summation via reference to some representation (e.g. analytic convergence in infinite-dimensional Hilbert space [12] , suprema in the natural partial order of an inverse category [15] , the Σ-monoid axiomatisation of [13, 3] , &c.) However, in every case, the representations given are self-similar structures in a monoidal category (a purely categorical explanation of how the polycyclic monoid arises from self-similarity is given in [16] ).
A particularly well-studied example is the monoidal category of partial isomorphisms on sets, with disjoint union (pInj, ). Here, any bijection N ∼ = N N gives rise to an embedding of the dynamical algebra in pInj(N, N) [15, 16] .
The key feature at this point is that -even though it does not have a coproduct -the monoidal category (pInj, ) admits matrix representations, as observed by many authors [15, 27, 3] . Thus, any isomorphism N ∼ = N N allows us to give (2 × 2) matrix representations to partial bijections on N. However, matrix representations for these arrows are not unique; instead, each matrix representation uniquely determines, and is determined by, such an isomorphism. The details of how these dagger self-similar structures act like bases for such matrix representations, allowing for many properties more familiar from linear algebra such as matrix representations, changes of basis, diagonalisations, mutual diagonalisation, &c. are the subject of a forthcoming paper.
Finally, for readers who fear that we have by now strayed way too far from any possible linguistic interpretation, we refer to the recent rediscovery of structures isomorphic to the dynamical algebra in linguistic models of meaning [4, 5] .
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A Order-preserving bijections N ∼ = N N as interior points of the Cantor set
We now give an explicit illustration of how the points of the Cantor set (excluding a distinguished subset of measure zero) may be interpreted as orderpreserving bijections exhibiting the self-similarity of the natural numbers (with respect to disjoint union; however, a very similar construction applies to the natural numbers with Cartesian product -this is left as an exercise).
Definition A.1. The Cantor set is defined to be the set of all one-sided infinite binary strings, C = {0, 1} ω or equivalently, the set Fun(N, {0, 1}) of all functions from N to {0, 1}. A point a = a 0 a 1 a 2 a 3 . . . of the Cantor set is called a boundary point if there exists some K ∈ N such that, for all L ≥ K, a L = a K . We denote the set of all boundary points by C B . The complement of the boundary is called the interior, denoted C O = C \ C B . Members of C O are called interior points or balanced functions. Note that the set of boundary points is a countable subset of C , whereas its complement, the set of interior points, has the same cardinality as the Cantor set itself Theorem A.2. Each interior point of the Cantor set η ∈ C O uniquely determines and is determined by an order-preserving bijection η : N → N N.
Proof. By construction, the balanced function η : N → {0, 1} divides N into two disjoint countably infinite subsets N = η −1 (0) ∪ η −1 (1) . Each of these subsets is totally ordered, with order inherited from N in the obvious way, so N is divided into two disjoint countably infinite chains. This is illustrated by example in figure 4 .
Each interior point η : N → {0, 1} uniquely determines and is determined by such a split into disjoint chains; η is simply the indicator function for chain membership. As both chains are countably infinite, this therefore determines a bijection η : N → N N in the obvious way. Formally, taking N N Although the above example is simple, we emphasise that Theorem A.2 is about all interior points of the Cantor set, not simply the computable ones. For example, we could consider an enumeration of Turing machines T 0 , T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , . . . and define the interior point u ∈ C O by u(n) = 0 if T n halts, and u(n) = 1 otherwise. By Theorem A.2, this also corresponds to an (uncomputable) orderpreserving bijection N → N N.
It is entirely possible that, should we restrict ourselves to computable interior points of the Cantor set, we would be able to develop a consistent theory of computable self-similar structures. However, this is work that remains to be carried out.
B Isbell's argument in a general setting
In [30] , MacLane introduces associativity up to isomorphism, by reference to a result of J. Isbell, on denumerable objects in the category (Fun, ×) of sets and functions with Cartesian product. Isbell demonstrated that, for any object D ∈ Ob(Fun), the existence of a bijection between D and D × D would, in the presence of strict associativity, force all endomorphism arrows of D to be identified (i.e. D would necessarily be isomorphic to the unit object of (Fun, ×)).
This gave a very strong argument for the necessity of considering associativity up to isomorphism, rather than strict associativity; requiring strict associativity forces an identification of the natural numbers N with the one-object set { * }, in the category (Fun, ×). A slight variation of Isbell's argument, in more modern language, demonstrates that this is not unique to the Cartesian closed category Fun.
Let S be a self-similar object of some symmetric monoidal category (C, ⊗), and let the subcategory S ⊗ be the full subcategory of S given in Definition 8.4.
It is stated in this definition that S ⊗ is a unitless monoidal category. This is correct; however, it is worth considering the objects of S ⊗ to see why none of these act as the unit object for S ⊗ . In particular, for every object X ∈ Ob(S ⊗ ), it is a simple corollary of Proposition 8.5 that X ⊗ S ∼ = X ∼ = S ⊗ X The natural question then, is: why is S ∈ Ob(S ⊗ ) not the unit object? The simple answer is that, although X ⊗ S ∼ = X ∼ = S ⊗ X, the arrows exhibiting these isomorphisms do not satisfy the coherence conditions given in [30] -in particular, their interaction with the other canonical isomorphisms fails.
However, when we ignore canonical isomorphisms and coherence conditions this is no longer an obstacle, and we are forced to conclude that the category (S ⊗ , ⊗) does indeed have a unit object; S itself -with all this implies about the endomorphism monoid of S (see Proposition 3.7).
